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MEDIA MISREPRESENTATION PREDISPOSING IRANIAN SOCIAL
DIVIDE
Adelia Hanny Rachman
Department of Anthropology, Faculty of Cultural Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada,
Bulaksumur, Yogyakarta, 55281, Indonesia
E-mail: adelia@alumni.ui.ac.id
Abstract
The Islamic Revolution of 1979 brought Iran to be transformed into a new revolutionary
theocratic republic. This is in line with the raison d’être of the Iranian constitution, realizing
the life of the nation and state based on the noble and universal values of Islam. Meanwhile,
the existence of power competition and conflicting conceptions of authority have been
reflected in its political constellation. Islam in the realm of this state is not only understood as
a religious institution but also a concept of political spirituality. The hijab policy, for
example, has become part of Iranian culture ever since and became a political symbol after
the government of Shah Pahlavi in 1936 banned the use of the hijab through the Kashf e
Hejab decree. In addition, visual observations through various authentic and reliable video
recordings and news reports from Iran over the past 5 years are made to examine what is
misunderstood by the world about Iran and its people. Therefore, the results of the analysis
should be able to explain how media distortion affects Iran’s political decisions. Because
politics plays an important role in the expression of public policy. If the policies implemented
contain identity politics, then it will have a significant impact on the emergence of social
divisions in Iranian society.
Keywords: Identity Politics, Iranian Society, Media Misrepresentation, Social Cleavage/Divide.

INTRODUCTION
Iran or Persia is one of the oldest

Persia spread its wings of power to the

civilizations in the world with a population

territory of Eastern Europe and the

almost 80 million people based on the

Arabian Peninsula in 550 – 336 BC even

2016 census (Statistical Center of Iran,

its territory became the main battlefield of

2021), while in 2021 it is estimated will

several great powers: the Ottoman Empire,

grow up to more than 85 million people.

Britain, Russia, and Germany in the 1910s

Located in West Asia with geopolitical

(Jackson, 2018). The abundance of natural

mapping in the Middle East region, Iran is

resources, on the other hand, become a

blessed

extractive

trigger for the oil war. The British

resources. Realized from the start on the

established an oil refinery company, The

potential of resources in the country,

Anglo-Persian Oil Company, in Iran in the

with

abundant
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early 1900s after finding good quality oil
in

the

Khuzestan

world

economic

depression

this

around the 1930s became one of the

commercial reason then shifted Britain’s

driving factors for the onset of World War

focus to no longer guarding the British

II, countries with strong military forces

India

the

such as Germany challenged British and

sustainability of oil supplies to support its

French interests in Iran and Iraq as a

war interests with Germany in World War

political step for regional expansion in line

I (Axworthy, 2013). At that time, politics

with America’s presence in its commercial

became the main concern of a country

and private interests which at that time

because it was used as a tool to spread

was seen as an opportunity for the Shah’s

influence and control natural resources.

government to support his country's

Iranian oil was a ‘vital’ strategic asset

political affairs (Jackson, 2018). The coup

(sine qua non) for Britain in wartime, the

d'état of the Prime Minister of Iran,

essentiality of which was also recognized

Mohammad Mosaddegh, in 1953 (28

by Germany (Axworthy, 2013; Jackson,

Mordad coup d'état) was described as an

2018). The agreement between the two

effort to save Iran from international

countries did not benefit Iran as the host

communism, an attempt by Britain and

and owner of natural resources so that it

America to perpetuate economic interests

received strong criticism from nationalists

in it related to international oil cartels,

throughout the country before finally in

strengthen the monarchy, or be regarded as

1921, Britain withdrew its troops (except

a spontaneous nationalist mass movements

in Southwest Iran to protect the oil) as

(claimed without foreign interference) that

agreed with Reza Shah which at that

support national revival although the latter

moment

is not supported by historical facts

border

was

establishing

a

but

Province,

The

maintaining

not

prevented

new

government,

from
the

Pahlavi dynasty (Axworthy, 2013). In

(Abrahamian,

2008;

Rahnema,

2015;

Gölz, 2020).

subsequent oil wars, such as the Japanese

At the beginning of the 20th century,

invasion of the Dutch East Indies in 1942

Iran was aggressive in voicing change

and Iraq to Kuwait in 1990, it was not

through the propaganda of new ideologies

based on a greedy desire to obtain foreign

and constitutional reforms that had an

oil reserves but for security needs which

impact on the mental and sociocultural

were considered essential and demanded

transformation of Iranian society (Nassehi-

the regime’s survival (Meierding, 2016).

Behnam, 1985). The Islamic revolution in
1979 brought Iran into an Islamic state that

https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/meis/vol9/iss1/1
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established Islamic values and norms

modernization

which

the

Islam and emphasizes Iran’s pre-Islamic

implementation of sharia law. Islam is not

heritage with modern technology; (c)

only a religious entity but also part of the

modernist groups, who identify themselves

system of social and political order

as Muslim and emphasize adapting to

(Griffith, 1979). In Iran, until the late

social change, could even be added; and

1970s, there were two major political

(d) heterodox groups (rebels), who adhere

traditions: the Persian Empire and Shia

to

Islam – the latter group ruling the Iranian

millenarianism, perfectionism, elitism, and

regime until today with the same tendency

the secrecy of religion or belief when in a

to oppose secular (Western) rather than

threatening situation or taqiyyah (Griffith,

any

belief-based

1979). The Islamic revolution in Iran was

authority, such as Sunni Islam (Griffith,

marked by the change of regime from

1979). According to Griffith, the tragedy

Pahlavi

of the killing and massacre of the great

revolutionary movement involved several

leader of the Shia, Imam Husayn (son of

social groups such as ulama, young

Ali bin Abi Talib and grandson of the

intellectuals, traders, middle class people

Prophet

(e.g.

were

other

embodied

religious

Muhammad)

or

by

in

Shimr

bin

group,

heterodox

principles

(Shah)

public

to

or

Shia

tolerates

such

Islam.

professional

The

sector

workers),

orders of Yazid bin Muawiyah (Khalifah

migrant communities – then gave rise to

Sunni Yazid – Shah1) considered a defeat

dual sovereignty, the reign of Ayatollah

of justice by the power of a tyrant.

Khomeini within the reign of Reza Shah

Iran has remained in (i) the conflict
between

modernization

and

Western

working-class

as

Ziljaushan (commander of Yazid) on the

Hitherto, the ambivalent attitude in

and

which

people,

Pahlavi (Ashraf and Banuazizi, 1985).
Since the formation of the Islamic
republic in the 1979 revolution, there have

domination also (ii) the split between

been

contradictions

within

Iran’s

adherence to Shia Islam and Iran’s pre-

government structure – competing power

Islamic heritage – which resulted in

divisions and conflicting conceptions of

several typologies of society, which are (a)

political authority (Takeyh, 2003). Raison

Islamic reformer groups, who seeks to

d'être of Iran's constitution is to realize the

integrate Shia Islam with aspects of

life of the nation and state in accordance

modern technology; (b) a westernized

with the noble and universal values of
Islam. As a republic, Iran has a unique

1

Shah means king, in this case it is distinguished by the
use of the term caliph (khalifah) as leader.

Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2022
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(theocracy-absolutism) and democracy.

harmonious. The vortex of conflict is not

The reflection of this duality leads to

only in the midst of the two governments

different political goals so it cannot be

concerned, but also extends to their

ruled out that disagreements and tensions

respective allies. It is undeniable that

occur between those who seek to build a

politics plays a very dominant role in the

religion-based system of government and

life of Iranian society. In fact, politics has

those who advocate a more representative

entered the media lines, both mass media

democratic government (Takeyh, 2003).

and social media, in the sense that the

The reform movement emerged in the late

media does not only present news which is

1990s, around 1998 when the reformist

claimed to be neutral, but also tendentious

party, the Islamic Iran Participation Front

to certain political interests or preferences.

(IIPF) was formed when one of its leading

Moreover, social media has become a new

members, Mohammad Khatami, ran in the

medium for propaganda – thus having a

1997 Iranian presidential election (Takeyh,

great influence in driving public opinion.

2003). The emergence of quite intense

In this paper, I do not generalize the media

turmoil or in other words the clear

but through analysis using the cleavage

opposition of coalition and opposition

theory, I will show the effect of media

made

misrepresentation on the emergence of

Iran’s

identity

oscillate

at

a

crossroads, namely between the promise of

social divisions in Iranian society.

democratic modernity and retrogressive
tradition (Takeyh, 2003).
Political relations among Iran and the
United States are represented as less
Theoretical Framework
The 1979 Iranian Revolution was not

religion) and profane (not related to

only a manifestation of the crystallization

religion or religious goals) as proposed by

of a new revolutionary theocratic republic

Émile

based on spiritual experience, but a

Rahimi, 2012). Iran is the world’s largest

transformation of Shia Islam into a new

Shia population, but also home to several

intersubjective force of religiosity in

religions and beliefs. Before Islam spread

creating a new concept of ‘political

to Iran, Iranian society in the past was

spirituality’ (as proposed by Foucault) of

mostly polytheistic. There are two gods:

the dichotomy of what is sacred (regarding

the Sun God and the Sky God, who are

https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/meis/vol9/iss1/1
DOI: 10.7454/meis.v9i1.141
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believed to have an influence on social

concern Iranian women because starting

relations.

also

from intellectual development it is very

monotheistic

possible to increase their social status so

In

inseparable
beliefs

addition,
from

other

besides

Iran

Islam,

is

namely

the society will regard them competent and

Zoroastrianism or Magianism in 1200-

capable. The development of social capital

1000 BC – believing in one God, which is

carried out by Iranian women, including

Ahura Mazada2 (The One Almighty God)

building digital freedom, creating new

– spread by the Zoroastrians and the reign

dress

of Cyrus the Great throughout Persia. The

(entertainment)

Zoroastrian holy book is the Avesta. The

changing social and sexual relationships

influence of beliefs that exist in Iranian

(Salehia et al., 2020).

(Persian) society cannot be separated from
several

major

civilizations

such

as

up

style

and

recreational

opportunities,

and

This historical and cultural background
shows

there

are

social

Greece.

accommodate

ancient

although they do not necessarily lead to

Mesopotamia which related to racial,

division, but the nature and intensity of

religious, and linguistic equality.

emotions and reactions which espouse

Mesopotamia,
Akkadian

Egypt,

was

and

spoken

in

interests’

differences,
distinctions,

The placement of women in unequal

membership in these groups, as well as the

social status in the society is not more due

types of social and political ties which

to that desperation, but the absence of

institutionally unite individuals to join in a

opportunities for women to be facilitated

group (Bartonili, 2005). In this study, the

in order to make changes, especially basic

cleavage is seen in the context of potential

changes in the economy. In a study

lines of division in a particular society as

conducted by Mohammadpur, et al. in

Scott C. Flanagan argues (Choe, 2003).

2014 it was said that the majority of

Iranian

women tend to avoid risk because of the

ideological cleavage which related to

influence of frustration and pessimism in

differences

their present and future lives so that they

(ideology). This difference may not be

are

conservative

seen and realized directly owing the

(Mohammadpur et al., 2014). Education

subject of this research is Iranian society

and work are two important things that

in general, not referring to members of a

encouraged

to

be

social

in

divide

political

emphasizes

preferences

particular organization. The concept of
2

The figure of Ahura Mazada is contrasted with the
figure of Ahriman or druj who comes from Angra
Mainyu and considered to have negative energy.

Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2022
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structural),

(b)

elements

matters. Western media often do not show

regarding values and beliefs, and (c)

the positive side of Iran which actually can

organizational or behavioral elements

be seen from the point of view of the

including individual, institutional, and

social life of its people. Reports about Iran

organizational

(Bartolini,

in the (West) mass media tend to be

2000). According to Bartolini, the socio-

dominated by negative and politically

structural, normative-cultural, and politics-

charged

organizational elements are interdependent

impression of poor representation. In this

in

and

era, the media often use the concept of

behavior (Bartolini, 2000). This divisions

sympathetic representation as a new

caused by historical experience, associated

strategy that raises racial stereotypes

with certain attributes that are flexible –

(Alsultany, 2012). Nevertheless, there are

relatively

still a number of daily videos posted on

shaping

normative

interactions

individual

volatile,

attitudes

and

disorganized

(Bartolini, 2000).

narratives,

thus

giving

the

YouTube or other social media platforms

The influence dispersing through the

displaying the other side of Iranian

implemented law and public policies, also

people’s lives which separated from the

media which is functionally present as a

hustle-bustle of any political things. This

party

and

is where the true personality of Iranians

wider

lives explored deeper and could be able to

community. Reporting in the media serves

enlighten the global community. In the

the basic needs of accurate information

end, the media has more sovereignty and is

and create an image representation of

relatively autonomous to frame politics

things,

and represent it (Castells, 2010).

that

provides

communication

information

needs

whether

for

the

individuals,

groups,

countries, inanimate objects to ideological
Research Methods
This

research

conducted by

age from 18 to 45 years with different

English in-depth interviews with 25

genders, educational, and professional

Iranian

via

backgrounds. They are also scattered in

media

several regions in Iran, such as Kerman,

platforms such as Tandem, Instagram,

Ishfahan, Mashhad, etc. but the majority

WhatsApp, Skype, and Zoom from 3

are based in Tehran. Observations were

October to 30 November 2021. Interviews

also made through authentic and credible

were conducted with Iranians ranging in

video recordings and documentaries about

citizens

teleconference

was

online

through

https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/meis/vol9/iss1/1
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Iran and its people published on various

was done on international news websites

social media in the period 2016 to 2021.

and presented several examples. The

Online

in

analysis is carried out using the cleavage

discussing and sharing their experiences as

theory to see the social phenomena as a

Iranian citizens, became the main source

whole by elaborating it with a dispersion

of this research in order to provide an

model

overview of the real perspective of social

misrepresentation. The use of qualitative

life in Iran and its life preferences so as to

research methods in this analytical method

further help determine the consequences of

will be able to show the relationship of

Iran’s misrepresentation by the media. In

external influences on the internal life of

order to find out the form of this

Iranian society. In this way, the subtle

misrepresentation, narrative exploration

social cleavage can be seen more clearly.

meetings

with

Iranians

of

the

influence

of

Results and Discussion
Culture in Iranian society according to
Sadeq Hedayat, an Iranian anthropologist

leaders who emphasize religious values
(Hoodfar & Sadr, 2010).

who was popular in the 1910-1920s, is

As an Islamic country, Iran controls

divided into two elements, namely Iranian

the social order of its people, both in the

and

modernist

media and in the public sphere, thereby

nationalist perspective) – here Islamic

limiting the freedom of expression of its

culture is placed as a foreign element

citizens, although many Iranians enjoy this

which is considered irrational and anti-

condition by utilizing public spaces in a

modern while the cultural heritage of pre-

“certain sense” such as traditional coffee

Islam is reckoned the original culture of

shops (qahvekhane) and the mosque as a

Iranian society and is judged according to

discussion

the values of modernity (Fazeli, 2006).

Takeyh, 2021). Talking about political

One of the cultures deeply rooted in

aspirations (khasteha-ye siasi) in coffee

Iranian society is related to the gender-

shops or public spaces in general is

based dichotomy in access to human

something that is very avoided by Iranians,

rights. Women’s rights, in the extreme, are

often

used as tools in the power struggle

aspirations (khasteha-ye ejtema’i) relating

between the Pahlavi regime that favors

to social issues, so according to Tagi

modernity

Azadarmaki the coffee shop is an anti-

non-Iranian

and

(from

a

conservative

religious

they

forum

only

(Khosravi,

talk

about

2008;

social

political site but also a counter-site, the

Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2022
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social

demands

being

discussed

are

superficial political tool to create political

actually part of political demands, for

opinion (Khosravi, 2008). On the other

example issues related to social welfare

hand, in private space, Iranians have more

(Khosravi, 2008). The politicization of

freedom, for example, they can still

lifestyle makes coffee shops also become a

organize parties, dance, etc.

“We used to party, both with fellow men and with women, which was usually done at
the homes of friends, relatives, or family because in Iran there are no public spaces
such as bars or clubs,” (Iranian man).

In the Iranian family tradition, men are

domestic work which does not affect the

considered to have a higher social status

superiority of men – husbands (Nassehi-

than women. Men in terms of playing the

Behnam, 1985).

role of a husband or father are the

Iranian families mostly apply Islamic

undisputed masters who are responsible

culture and rules, for example parents

for the family economy (khânevâdeh), as

encourage their children not to date or

well as kinship groups (tâyefeh) (Nassehi-

have relationships with the opposite sex

Behnam, 1985). The kinship system is

outside of marriage (courtship). Even

patrilineal or patriarchal based on male

though in reality, some of the young

supremacy

1985).

Iranians still embrace the courtship. Here

Therefore, women are required to obey

we can see that there is an imbalance

their husbands or older people but this

between expectations and reality or as

does not mean that women lose their

simple as a difference in perspective

personality

As

between parents and their children. Iranian

modernization enters the line of family

youth often dichotomize their generation

life,

career

with their parents’ generation. The kinship

opportunities and this change also affects

network in the city (khânedân) and in the

the division of roles based on gender in the

village (tâyefeh) still acts as a protective

family so that their domestic role is

system. When a person achieves a high

reduced while their role in determining

social status through education, career, etc.

policies and managing the family budget is

kinship networks emerge around it and

increasing – what is unique is women

create new socio-political pressure groups

(wife) in lower-middle class families must

(Nassehi-Behnam, 1985).

(Nassehi-Behnam,

and

women

individuality.

have

more

continue to work while taking care of
“In everyday life such as school and relationships in the family there is a separation
between men and women, but not in friendship – “courtship” – it depends on the
individual,” (Iranian men and women).

https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/meis/vol9/iss1/1
DOI: 10.7454/meis.v9i1.141
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Internalization of Islamic values and

Freedom campaign movement, followed

ideology in policy, for example related to

by White Wednesday campaign in 2017.

dress code. The obligation to use the hijab

Hijab became a political symbol when the

(head cover) is an official government

pro-western government, the Pahlavi, in

policy that has many pros and cons

1936 banned the use of Islamic attributes

associated with human rights restrictions.

such as the hijab and chador in the Decree

Often it is also a tool for those who oppose

of Kashf e Hejab. By feminists, the

to generalize the hijab wearer as a

regulation is a form of progressive

depressed subject even though many of

government action (Mahdi, 2004). Hijab

them use it voluntarily for modesty

has become part of Iranian culture since

reasons. Several movements are an effort

the 1979 Islamic revolution. Not all

to oppose the obligation to use the hijab,

Iranian women who do not agree with this

including the ‘Change for Equality’

policy, voluntarily and bravely express

movement in 2006, some Iranian women

their defense of their rights in public,

protest legal discrimination by signing a

because they are afraid that a larger

petition with a target of one million

authority will judge them so that the

signatures

the

discourse of disapproval of the use of the

government. Furthermore, in 2014 there

hijab is a sensitive thing to talk about in

was Compulsory Hijab: My Stealthy

public.

to

be

submitted

to

“I don’t agree with the mandatory wearing of the hijab but I neither don’t want to go
down to the streets nor join White Wednesday because the worst consequence, I could
be jailed,” (Iranian woman, some others have similar answers).

Dress code policy is not an appeal but

2002). Mir-Hosseini further explained that

an obligation so that in the context of its

after 1997, a number of reports in the

enforcement, the state has provided such

reformist

‘moral’ police as a repressive measure. In

government’s

1983, in the Islamic Punishment Rule

mandatory use of the hijab which the

(Ta’zirat) – punishments imposed for

group

negligence or considered as a violation act

anachronistic3 with the reform discourse

toward Islamic sharia – Article 102 states

advocated by reformist groups. An Iranian

that appearing in public without a hijab is

reformer, Hasan Yousefi Eshkevari, in an

a violation of public morality and can be

article published in Neshat (1378 or 1999),

media
policy

considered

questioned
regarding

the
the

inappropriate

punished according to sharia namely
being lashed with 74 lashes (Mir-Hosseini,

Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2022
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“Defending Values with the Logic of

tankers off the coast of the United Arab

Democracy,” revealed that differences of

Emirates and the Saudi oil port of Yanbu

opinion regarding religion and moral

in the Red Sea (Al Jazeera, 2019). The

values can be defended with one logic, the

accusations against Iran, were opposed by

logic of democracy (Mir-Hosseini, 2002).

the Iranian Foreign Minister, Mohammad

Documentary video of “Whispers from

Javad Zarif, who doubted the veracity of

Iran” by Alice Falco of 2018 shows the

the accusations considering that at the

harmonious interfaith life in Iran and the

same time as these events, Japanese Prime

expression of Iranian society in conditions

Minister Shinzo Abe is on a diplomatic

of limited freedom. Apart from Islam,

visit to Tehran to help ease friction

Zoroastrianism and Christianity are some

between Iran and the United States.

of the beliefs and religions that are

Khomeini added that resistance does not

embraced by some Iranians. Zoroastrians

mean military action – this is in line with

show that religion is not a compulsion to

analysts’ skepticism that the attack was

be accepted by everyone, even their

highly doubtful by Iran considering that it

descendants until they can think logically

will have major consequences for the

and will it. Religion requires a harmonious

United States and its regional allies, so

life in moderation (Falco, 2018).

will Iran involve its allies (Behravesh,

In addition to domestic affairs, Iran’s

2019).

political power can penetrate national

Other reports, for example, poured

boundaries. These tendentious and biased

provocative accusations that Iran had

reports dominate the international media,

doubled

especially

unfounded

threatened to increase enrichment closer to

accusations against Iran. In many cases,

weapons levels in an attempt to pressure

the media contribute to the formation of a

Europe into the 2015 nuclear deal. In the

particular political statement, as between

context of reporting on nuclear issues

the United States and its allies with Iran.

alone, two or more countries have been

In 2019, the United States accused Iran of

busy preparing an attack strategy against

attacking

Kokuka

Iran. This can be seen from the impact of

Courageous and Norway's Front Altair on

rising tensions between these countries.4

fake

news

Japanese

or

tankers

uranium

production

and

June 13, 2019 in the Gulf of Oman
(Gambrell 2019). Earlier, on May 12,
2019, the United States National Security
Adviser accused Iran of attacks on oil
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/meis/vol9/iss1/1
DOI: 10.7454/meis.v9i1.141
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Several attacks were executed by its rivals,

Mair which has been simplified by

including the assassination of Iran’s

Chiavacci, namely grouping into three

military leader, Qasem Soleimani, on

divisions based on the following factors,

January 3, 2020, through a United States

(a) socio-economic (sociostructural), (b)

drone attack at Baghdad International

collective

Airport. Second, the assassination of

(normative-cultural),

Iranian

Mohsen

organizational (Bartolini, 2000; Chiavacci,

Fakhrizadeh with a Belgian-made FN

2010). So far, social divisions have

MAG 7.62mm machine gun mounted on a

occurred in the internal environment of

robot powered by artificial intelligence, as

Iranian society, particularly regarding

reported on The New York Times website

differences in ideology, politics, social

that Fakhrizadeh was killed by Mossad,

class, culture, and religion. In Iranian

Israel’s Intelligence Service. (Bergman &

politics, apart from reformist groups, there

Fassihi, 2021).

are

nuclear

scientist

also

identity

and
and

behavior

(c)

neo-conservative

politics-

intellectual

Such political representations often

groups, namely those who give recognition

stain Iran’s relational relations with its

to the absolute supremacy of guardianship

rival countries to the point of giving the

from Islamic jurists (velayat-e faqih) and

impression of a ‘zero tolerance power

rejection

struggle,’ even though all parties are trying

opposition to the presumption of the

to make peace, the stalemate is one of the

people’s voice (vox populi) is the voice of

problems that results in the perpetuation of

God (vox dei), and religious pluralism

political sentiment among them. In this

(Khosrokhavar, 2001). Western bias is

case, the media as an external party that

seen as an accusation underlying Iran’s

has a very large influence takes an

conservative

important role, starting from narrating to

discourse in discrediting both reformers

representing everything for the benefit of

and a more open ‘moderate’ society

public consumption. The media is no

(Khosrokhavar, 2001). In order to demand

longer limited to presenting empirical facts

a change, the neo-conservatives try to

but also analyzing and even producing

enter the regime of the status quo

interpretive meanings that can have an

government hoping the change starts from

impact on shaping public opinion.

within the political system.

of

Western

intellectual

democracy,

and

political

The concept of social cleavage in this
study adopts the theory of Bartolini and

Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2022
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Scheme 1. Dispersion* The Effect of Iran's Misrepresentation.
*Adopted Newton’s physics theory of light dispersion symbol (Newton, 1730).
Political system:
generate law and public
policy (political
consensus)

Dispersion: reaction or
form of adjustment
created of a political
consensus

Politicization of identity
Examples of sociocultural phenomena

Dispersion
Media
misrepresentation

Class divide
Social cleavage
Legal compliance
Social movement
Cultural clash
Discrepancy
Discrimination / racism

Prism: political system

The influence dispersion model can

films or television shows exhibit counter-

describe socio-cultural phenomenon that

characters,

arise due to the influence of media

depicted as a big threat to the national

misrepresentation. Given that the media is

security of Western countries, one of

a fundamental vehicle in communication,

which is America (Alsultany, 2012).

the

diffusion

of

influence

and

Muslims

are

the

Western media, such as the United

persuasion of certain parties, as long as the

States, have for more than a century

media is relatively autonomous (free – not

misrepresented and stereotyped Muslim

bound) from political power, political

and Arab societies (Alsultany, 2012).

actors must comply with the rules,

According

technology, and media interests – in this

misrepresentation

case the media will frame any political

institutionalization of racial stereotypes,

matters (Castells, 2010). Not all media are

containing complex feelings such as grief,

neutral, being idealistic by showing their

trauma, fear, anger, to racism. Sympathetic

impartiality. There is still a tendency for

representation of these two identities

the media to strengthen the position of

becomes a new strategy that gives rise to

certain parties. After the terrorist attacks

racial

on September 11, 2001 in America, the

“Repeated associations between Islam and

stereotype of Muslims as terrorists is

terrorism will only increase anti-Muslim

getting higher, as seen in the themes of

prejudice.” – The Council on American-

https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/meis/vol9/iss1/1
DOI: 10.7454/meis.v9i1.141
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Arabs

to
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Alsultany,

this

contains

the

(Alsultany,

2012).
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Islam (BBC News, 2007). What happened

and influence the creation of multicultural

in an Islamic country, Iran, can be

illusions (Alsultany, 2012).

assumed to be no different from the

The

speed

of

teleportation

of

government in the Middle Ages, religion

information and communication supports

became a fundamental element, attached,

the migration and globalization of various

and fused in the order of people’s lives so

aspects, such as economics, politics, and

that it was considered an important

culture where the transnational character

element of political culture which could

of media representation makes it difficult

not be separated from the tensions

for countries to prevent contact with

(Humphreys, 2021). Culture is concerned

foreign influences (Gentz dan Kramer,

with the production, exchange of meaning

2006). The new world space of cultural

– giving and receiving meaning, and

products

interpretation of meaning – between

which are at the same time globalized and

individuals or groups in society (Hall,

localized within the framework of global

2003). The media play a cultural role in

capitalism

this

connects

activities, coalitions and resistances in

meaning, language, to culture (Hall, 2003).

practical life, as it can be seen that free-

The representation system consists of

market capitalism has a major influence on

individual concepts, ways of organizing,

the local economy (Dissanayake, 2006).

grouping, organizing, classifying concepts,

Massive coverage in the media allows the

and reconstructing complex relationships

audience to reach a wider range of

between

17).

information, but on the other hand, the

Representation is a practice – uses material

potential for duplicated, repetitive, and

objects and effects but its meaning is not

defective information is also unbearable

based on material quality but on its

(Anderson,

symbolic function (Hall, 2003). Simplified

ideological narratives leads governments

complex representation is a strategy used

to devote resources and time to trying to

by the media in the post-racial era to show

shape and influence public perceptions in a

the impression of complex representations,

way that is conducive to their chosen

internalizing

that

policies – involving the promotion of

legitimize racist policies and practices –

policies through carefully crafted public

generally signifying racial representations

communication campaigns, exploits the

that can complicate previous stereotypes

relationship of journalists and media

matter.

Representation

them

(Hall

2003,

rationalizations

and

national

produces

2009).

representations

two

The

opposing

power

of

outlets, and takes advantage of their

Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2022
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attempts to dominate the information

million from year to year especially due to

circumstances – propaganda (Robinson,

the COVID-19 pandemic (World Bank,

2013).

2021),5 while as of June 2021, the

Sharia-based policies are a reflection

unemployment rate in Iran reached 8.8%

of the Iranian government’s concern on the

with the average female and urban

basis of religious values and norms, not on

unemployment being more than men and

the conflicting values of modernization as

rural areas (Statistical Center of Iran,

echoed by the media, but its disagreement

2021). The average income of the Iranian

with

people is 1:3 when compared to the

Western

Mannheim

hegemony.

(1992)

argue,

Hill

and

“where

average income of the Indonesian people.

worldviews have existed, ideology is often

Structural failures in the context of the

heard, suggesting representations that are

implementation of public policies by the

contestable, socially positioned, . . . laden

government have a major impact on the

with political interests and structurally

community when the tendency of these

diverse” (Keller, 2011). One of Iran’s

policies makes the country’s economic

political policies that have a very large

condition unstable and getting worse.

influence on the international community

Disappointment and discontent surround

is related to nuclear energy. On Iran's

the feelings of many Iranians who identify

political decision on this matter, Western

themselves as part of the opposition –

countries

disagreeing with the ideology of a

condemned

it.

Economic

sanctions are a punitive instrument used by

sovereign

government,

the United States in order to arrest Iran for

secularists, the proletariat and the counter-

its disagreements in the non-proliferation

government.

agreement. These economic sanctions

Western perspective that can be accepted

have had such a huge impact on the

as a form of impression as well as

Iranian economy, the most obvious thing

criticism is regarding the concept of

is that inflationary pressures increased to

polarization in Iranian politics which then

48% as of February 2021 as indicated by

reduces tolerance, so that when the state

the depreciation of the Iranian currency

issues policies containing identity politics

which reached 0.000024/USD and the

as well as restrictive and repressive

large number of unemployed reached 9.4%

polarization, the state will implement them

in the fourth quarter (Q$) in 2020

by force or threats (Siavoshi, 1997). In this

Another

especially

the

conventional

accompanied by a decrease in the number
5

of job opportunities by more than 1
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/meis/vol9/iss1/1
DOI: 10.7454/meis.v9i1.141
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Iranian stock market.
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case the reduction of tolerance does not

academically

and

only occur in the vertical relationship

emigrate temporarily or permanently due

between the government and society, but

to the economic and political instability of

also horizontally among its communities.

a country (Raghuram, 2009; Haghighi,

Given that politics has a big hand in

Bijani, & Parhizkar, 2018). Policy reforms

manifesting public policy. If the policies

are needed in order to control the pace of

implemented contain the politicization of

movement of Iran’s talented people,

identity, then this has a significant effect

“principled

on the emergence of social divisions in

policies and practices that offer elites a

society. The Iranian press shows the

more substantial role in running the

existence of an ideological dichotomy,

country, greater individual and social

which consists of a press that is affiliated

freedoms, increase job security and better

with the state (government) and the private

compensation (Kamyab, 2015).

planning”

non-academicly)

i.e.

proposing

sector that favors the concept of civil

Western media has covered a lot of

society, while being afraid of the potential

Iranian politics and the socio-economic

for

state’s

impact of its people, but very little has

‘suspicion’ of its people who regard it as

been published about its humanity and

an oppositional force and are articulated in

social relations in which the values of

a

personality

latent

dangers

contradictory

from

way

the

(Berger,

2002;

Khiabany, 2008).
As

a

and

local

wisdom

are

embedded which are far from negative

result

implementing

representations. Iranian society essentially

inappropriate policies, there will be gaps,

upholds high human values in an epic

both

In

collaboration of culture and spirituality.

particular it will reduce confidence in the

Islamic culture imprinted in people’s lives

opposition or the government. Economic

cannot be separated from religious values

instability is the main factor in the brain

that

drain phenomenon, many Iranian scientists

practically. So far, the Iranian people,

choose to leave their country in order to

known as the largest Shia adherents, one

get a better life. Structural failures have an

of the Islamic sects, are represented in

impact

of

political, racist narratives, even calling

nationalism and sense of belonging to the

them terrorists just because they believe in

country.

Islam.

socially

on

and

of

economically.

decreasing

Brain

drain

the

is

sense

a

social

are

internalized

and

applied

phenomenon where talented citizens (both

Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2022
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“One day I met a Brazilian online, but when I said I was from Iran, he didn’t reply to
my messages and (probably) he thought I was a terrorist,” (Iranian man).

The values of nationalism, heroism,

and Imam Ali (Chehabi, 1995). Iranian

sportsmanship, justice, and caring (the

nationalism is the result of a combination

idea of pahlavan) are a reflection of Iran’s

of Islamic and modern Iranian cultural

cultural heritage as an Islamic country and

values (Bausani, 1960).

pre-Islamic culture exemplified by Rostam
I spoke to a 30 years old Iranian man. At first, he didn't mind the hijab I was wearing
but when I said that I was a Muslim and believed in Islam, he then showed the
opposite attitude, even though in this case he lived in a Muslim family. According to
him, being a Muslim is not being human. He builds a negative perception of Muslims
and does not distinguish between religion in the context of personal spirituality and
humanity in a social context.

The misrepresentation of the media

cognitive level and are not considered as

and the conditions of economic instability

something that threatens their existence,

in practical experience have made some

instead respecting the differences that

Iranians have skeptic views and take a

exist. Iranian society is not only known to

stand against the government’s ideology or

be friendly but also open-minded.

show behavior that leads to racism. Social

As we all know, Iran’s economic

discrimination based on race and religion

stability is currently being disrupted due to

indicates moral decline through such a

the imposition of economic sanctions by

disrespectful treatment toward human

the United States, but there are some

dignity

interesting things in relation to Iranian

(Daly,

2013).

They

draw

conclusions quickly by putting Islam and

society.

Muslims in an intolerant frame of mind.

foreign ‘punishments’ for the country do

His disapproval seems to be absolute and

not make its people feeling weaken or

he considers something right even though

disempowered, but instead become a spur

he does not respect for the religious

for them to become stronger in facing

freedom

ambivalent

various problems in their lives, although

behavior indicates resistance even by those

on the other hand the negative impact of

who are in the vortex of Islamic ideology

economic instability is clearly visible to

and culture. However, most Iranians

the suffering of the people including the

behave

their

potential to weaken trust (social capital),

disagreements on values-based matters

both to the government and to fellow

(ideology), both towards the government

citizens. Low wages resulted declining

and religion, are only limited to the

Iranian purchasing power and currency

of

others.

tolerantly

This

so

https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/meis/vol9/iss1/1
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value, more over due to inflation. Almost

to winter (Shab-e Yalda), or nature day

all Iranians I met complained about the

(Sizdah Be-dar) celebrations, which are

economic difficulties, including those who

sometimes not equated with religious

mentioned the lack of job opportunities.

observances such as Islamic holidays (Eid)

Even so, in that difficulty, they consider

or Christmas. Regardless of their political

the orientation of the priority and larger

orientation, Iranian society is basically

interests of the family. Many Iranians

family oriented and therefore they visit

choose to live permanently in Iran for this

each other’s relatives often in many

reason, some consider serving the country

occasions. Ta’ziyeh is interpreted not as a

a moral responsibility.

tradition, a representation of Islam, but

Their hospitality and openness applied

also a political legacy that starts with the

to everyone, even Americans. Iranian

martyrdom of the Islamic leader, Imam

society has the same perspective that

Hossein,

hospitality and openness are not racist and

Muhammad so that through ta'ziyeh the

not also exclusive. This reflects a clear

Iranian people express their sympathy,

dichotomy between political affairs and

sorrow, and consolation (Chelkowski,

social life. The idea of a ‘distributed

1977). The religiosity and communal

personality’ initiated by Marilyn Strathern

nature of its people are reflected in a series

is reflected here, when they use their

of religious rituals carried out in the month

feelings as social beings in relational

of Muharram, the Ashura celebration,

efficacy and call for a separation between

when Iranian people gather to mourn

the individual subject and the social

expressing sadness and grief (gham o

totality as expressed by Alfred Gell

gosseh),

(Rampley, 2005; Jiménez, 2008). Politics

one’s

does not disturb their human realm. The

spirituality, psychology, and social nature

media’s negative representation of Iran

and becomes a symbol of political loyalty

does not make Iranians bring up hate to the

(Good & Good, 1988). This cultural

West, even though some of them don’t

awareness shows the typical of a friendly

agree with Western ideology. Even though

society, both in family and community

in reality many Iranians want to work and

relationships.

live

in

other

parts

of

the

grandson

dysphoria
emotional

of

the

which

Prophet

symbolizes

involvement

in

world.

Meanwhile, they also still want to hold
onto their culture and/or religion, such as
the Persian New Year (Nowruz), autumn

Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2022
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Table 1. Iranians Social Divide based on Cleavage Theory.

Socio-Economic

Identity, Collective Behavior

Politics-Organizational

Bourgeois

Conservative

Pro-government

Middle ‘class’

Moderate

Neutral (Middle-line)

Proletarian

Secular

Counter government

Iran also has distinctive characteristics,

received formal education which bestowed

even though this country sets policies

them good literacy skills, they feared it

based on Islamic norms, but it is different

would be used for ‘forbidden’ acts which

from other Islamic countries such as Saudi

threaten the honor of men and women

Arabia or countries in the Arab Emirates

(Rostam-Kolayi, 2008). This fear, in

region. The dress code isn’t kept at a strict

Rostam-Kolayi’s perspective, has become

uniform standard, e.g. color demand and

so socially stigmatized that conservatives

so on. Based on the style of dress, at least

more unexpectedly consider education for

one can see the segmentation of Iranian

women a ‘sign of sexual and moral decay.’

society, namely conservative, moderate, or

However, at the beginning of the 20th

secular groups. The use of the words

century,

conservative and moderate does not

scholars who supported education for

indicate the level of religiosity but rather

women,

emphasizes the distinction based on

Dawlatabadi, Shaykh Hadi Najmabadi,

physical

and Shaykh Muhammad-Husayn Yazdi

appearance

or

values

held.

there

let

were

say:

also

Haji

Mirza

(Rostam-Kolayi,

clothes that cover head to toe, called

century, Iran provides wide opportunities

chador. Meanwhile, moderate or secular

for women to access education, many of

groups heed the provisions of state law by

whom are even working in the public

using a hijab and cloth that are long

sector.

manteau.

In

the

Hadi

Religious groups usually wear long black

enough to cover the lower waist, such as a

2008).

heterodox

21st

Capitalism and politics of interest
indirectly lead the media to expose things

In addition, Iran upholds women’s

beyond common control, including for

rights even though the equality is not fully

certain purposes the news is exploited so

implemented. Iranian women can fulfill

as to create an improper public image. The

their right to school. In the 1990s,

absence of the media in adequately

conservative groups had concerns about

reviewing the socio-cultural life of the

the ‘association of Muslim women’ who

community can make the representation

https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/meis/vol9/iss1/1
DOI: 10.7454/meis.v9i1.141

18

Rachman: Media Misrepresentation Predisposing Iranian Social Divide

lame if it only contains such a political

layered effects, including the emergence of

news. Therefore, the media must be able to

other forms of misrepresentation and

balance

the

information

production
in

order

of

accurate

resulting in a lack of trust in the

to

prevent

government even for other people with

misrepresentation and contribute as an

different

indirect

Misrepresentation

Furthermore, as a result of this resistance,

encourages those who are ‘wrongly’

there is fragmentation within society,

represented to take defensive actions

which are pro-government, middle-line,

which are then at the same time considered

and counter-government groups.

mediator.

political

preferences.

as a form of threat by the opposing party.

In the era of modern society, the

In this position, it is possible for the media

economy is an important aspect of life and

to become an agent of pitting against each

includes

other

When

monetization which is regulated by law in

political

its own rationality autonomously (Pratt,

relations between hostile countries, for

2003). The construction of class politics is

example Iran and the United States.

reflected in the actions taken in every class

Domestic and foreign policies imposed on

movement,

Iran as a form of repressive measure

demand

against Iran’s defensive efforts, will cause

problems such as wages and living

domestic economic chaos in Iran. The

standards to problems of social order by

influence and politics of the United States

inserting a broader vision of what it means

in this regard seem much stronger so that

to be human and how society can be

the economic downturn was felt by the

organized to create justice, equality, and

Iranian people. In this position, the

greater autonomy (Pratt, 2003). This class

community is the most vulnerable subject

movement is carried out through other

compared to the government because they

mediums, by overcoming other types of

have no influence in the process of

identity, such as gender, region, religion –

formation and decision making so that

which is included in the main narrative of

blind hatred arises against the government.

the class so that through such means the

The government’s positive efforts in

class movement will create a political

developing its society are still under

culture in part as a result of reactions to

criticism and pessimism from some people

rival political cultures (Pratt, 2003).

shows a vote of no confidence in the

Political culture is a collection of ideas,

government. Misrepresentation has multi-

institutions,

(divide

et

misrepresentation
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criticisms
of

to

that

economic

attitudes,

and

19

Jurnal Middle East and Islamic Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1 [2022], Art. 1

orientations

of

citizens

towards

the

uses this practice by setting policies that

political system and the life of the

can

government of their country (Humphreys,

economic conditions and include identity

2021).

politics in it, this will actually trigger a

The division of society in Iran is not
based on racism but rather a clear
distinction

of

political

have

an

impact

on

worsening

negative representation of itself to its
people.

preferences.

Differences in political preferences are

Sunstein refers to the results of Iyengar

not based on desire but are legitimate

and Westwood’s research that significant

disagreements

trust can come from the relationship of

transformed into a matter of principle –

individuals or groups with their political

when this partyism (partisanship) is at a

affiliations

Political

severe level – it is feared will have an

ideology determines the level of this

impact on the policies implementation

belief. The division of society in Iran

which actually aimed at improving social

stems from the problem of economic

welfare but because of the embedded

instability that limits its space for meeting

attitude of skepticism, it ultimately hinders

its basic needs and accessing human

the execution of these goals (Sunstein,

rights. The demands of the people are

2016). Political attitudes and behavior

actually focused on this, the Iranian people

depend on the social position in a nation

do not demand much about changing the

(Almond & Verba, 1963). The possibility

political system in the government but

of reflex abandonment of positive ideas

policies which can improve the people’s

put forward by the government must be

economy and give more freedom to the

jointly realized by all elements of Iranian

civil and political rights of their citizens. It

society. The in-group and out-group

is not expected to be done by certain

created are related to the alternative basis

interested parties, by taking advantage of

of group identity in which the divisions in

the

society are partisan based on alignments

(Sunstein,

momentum.

2016).

Actors

with

strong

al.,

can

2012;

then

Iyengar

be

influence have a tendency to exploit

(Iyengar

certain events or practices in order to carry

Westwood, 2015). Thus, Iranian social

out their political and socio-economic

divisions are one of the consequences of

agendas, and trigger broad opposition

media misrepresentation influence and the

(Klein, 2007; Martin, 2022). This strategic

politicization of identity, both in the media

operation is called disaster capitalism by

and public policy which later affect social

Naomi Klein. If the Iranian government

and economic instability.

https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/meis/vol9/iss1/1
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Conclusion
The Islamic revolution or the Khomeini

empirical reality which contributes greatly

revolution tried to make religion the basis

to

of politics (Adrahtas & Milani, 2021;

consciousness. When the media do not

Takeyh, 2021). Since then, the government

know more about a country and its people,

has imposed sharia law, one of which

then that’s where prejudices are built and

requires Iranian women to wear a head

narrated in such a way that a negative

covering, also known as the hijab. Some

stigma or stereotype is created about it. As

Iranians

dress.

a result, reports that are full of suspicion,

Disapproval of whatever is happening in

inaccuracies, and charged with accusations

the country can be expressed more freely

are often posted only for certain interests

on social media or digital networks than

and result in the deterioration of the

expressed in the real public space because

relationship between the two warring

such matters are sensitive. The efforts

parties. Furthermore, it has an impact on

could be made are basically based on the

decision-making by the government and

relaxation of basic human rights freedom

the public’s response to the policy. The

restrictions. The development of the

social division was caused by two very

character or image of Iran by the Western

dominant things, namely the empirical

media has so far been unbalanced, causing

reality of economic instability and identity

misrepresentation. The lack of exploration

politics in the policies issued by the

of the values of Iranian local wisdom

Iranian government. This has the potential

makes the media only see Iran from one

to weaken Iran’s social capital, through the

point of view, politics, which basically

reduction of public trust in its government,

only reviews it on the surface. The

even towards fellow Iranians who do not

analysis using the cleavage theory can

share the same ideology.

show

demand

the

freedom

of

collective

Social divisions in Iranian society can

influences to the internal life of Iranian

be recognized at least in several groups,

society. Social divisions in this study are

which are (i) conservative, moderate, and

related

secular

differences

of

formation

external

to

relationship

to

the

in

political

groups;

(ii)

preferences of the Iranian people who

middle-line,

shows representations of ideology and

groups; as well as (iii) the bourgeoisie,

values and are related to attitudes and

middle

opinions. Today, the division is not only

Conservative,

determined

bourgeois groups who can enjoy the

by

past
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experience

but

and

pro-government,

‘class’,

counter-government

and

proletariat.

pro-government,

or
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benefits of the country will tend to have a

the causes of social division are no

strong sense of belonging and regard their

different in the context of more than 40

presence for their country as a moral

years ago and today. Iran’s historical

responsibility, not just to gain economic

background shows its consistency in

benefits. A moderate, middle-line, or

placing attention on the basis of religious

middle ‘class’ is better in adapting itself

values and norms, not on the conflicting

within the constraints of conservative

values of modernization as echoed by the

pressures and the modern concept of

media, but on its disagreement toward

‘freedom.’ They tend to be neutral and

Western hegemony. However, the social

impartial.

counter-

divide is not rigid and still opens the

government, or proletariat tend to adhere

possibility of every Iranian selecting

to the notion of modernism and the

different preferences regardless to their

concept of separation of religion and state

socio-economic background. For example,

which expressly shows their disagreement

it’s undeniable that some of the middle

with the political system of their country.

‘class’ people actively speak up against

In addition, they often have ambitions to

public policies or proletariat who keep

leave their country because of economic

engaged to the political loyalty toward

instability and the application of Islamic

their governments.

Secular

groups,

values in their country. At the same time,

Thus, the misrepresentation of Iran by

some Iranians want changes in their socio-

the media has resulted in Iran taking

economic

on

defensive actions which at the same time

maintaining the continuity of the existing

are considered as a form of action that

system. Regarding the hijab policy, for

threatens the sovereignty of the opposing

example, which contains the politicization

party (the West). In this political interest,

of identity in it, it divides the community

the media plays a role in creating negative

because it involves intrusion into their

stereotypes against Iran and its people and

privacy space, but on the other hand, a

indirectly

group heeds this on the grounds of

between

ensuring the security of the dignity of the

policies that are set as a reaction to Iran

Iranian

young

greatly have an impact on Iran’s economic

Iranians think optimistically about the

instability. The influence and politics of

future of their country even though they

the United States in this regard seem much

are faced with difficult realities, especially

stronger so that the economic downturn

due to economic sanctions. It seems that

was felt by the Iranian people. In the end,

life

people.

but

others

Today

https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/meis/vol9/iss1/1
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insist

many

worsens
countries

political
and

even

relations
foreign
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the Iranian government must be able to

avoid politicizing identity in every policy

control itself and pay more attention to

in order to increase social capital and

pro-people policies, improve its diplomatic

improve social, economic and political

relations with Western countries, and

stability of Iran.
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